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INTRODUCTION
The last years have wi tnessed a remarkable growth in the number of studies on the economics of trade unions. l One important branch of this field explores the consequences of a monopoly union, i. e., a union that is sufficiently strong to control the wage rate. The union utility function typically includes the real wage and the level of employment as arguments and the union sets the wage rate in order to maximize this objective function, taking the aggregate labor demand schedule as given.
The monopoly union approach appears to capture significant aspects of wage setting in countries with strong unions, a small non-union sector and centralized wage setting (e. g. , the Scandinavian countries) • However, there are a number of wellknown objections to this model, including its lack of explicit treatment of the bargaining process and its failure to produce a Pareto-efficient outcome for the parties involved in the negotiations.
An additional questionable element of the model is the strict monopoly assumption i tself: wages are determined only through centralized union wage setting with no explicit role for firms, "market forces", or local wage negotiations.
A large part of wage increases in countries with nation-wide or industry-wide settlements has not been the direct consequences of central wage negotiations but instead shown up as "wage drift" , i.e., wage increases in addition to the wage rates The size of the total labor force is given as
where L 1 is the number of private sector employees in a good state and L 2 is the number of employed workers in the private sector in a bad state plus the number of unemployed (which, in turn, equals L -E 2 ).
All workers receive the same contractual wage rate and private sector employees obtain wage increases in excess of the union determined wage in good times. Wage rates for government sector employees in good states are given by
where r captures the degree of wage drift adjustment that public sector workers are enti tled to according to law (r exogenous) or union decision (r endogenous ) • -9 -
Government Policy Rules
The policy rules for the government are such that public sector employment is expanded in bad times in order to absorb a fraction of the unemployment that otherwise would have occurred. Analogously the government sector contracts in good times, thereby reducing excess demand. In short, the government hires in slumps and fires in booms.
The policy rules in explicit form are similar to those specified by Calmfors (1982) . Let GO denote the predetermined initial level of public employment. When excess demand occurs, the government decreases public employment in order to reduce the initial number of vacancies by a fraction, Yl' In the event of excess supply, the government increases public employment in order to reduce unemployment by another fraction, Y2' The government reaction functions are:
It is reasonable to assume that Yl and values in the unit interval. Negative In good times, the pool of workers available for the private sector is L 1 _ L G l af ter the government has acted. The wage drift adjustment function is given by (7 ) where k = (-Al (Xl)' implying that wage drift is proportional to excess demand for labor (i. e. J vacancies) in the private sector. This simple Walrasian wage adjustment rule has proved to "work" surprisingly weil in econometric studies of wage drift. The union has good reasons to believe that wage drift primarily is driven by excess demand for labor -and to take this relationship into consideration in its wage demands.
The model abstracts from taxes and from uti lit Y affects of changes in the public sector I s output.
The assumptions are not unreasonable when considering a single industry-wide union; the tax changes and the output effects are likely to be distributed over (more or less) all individuals in the economy rather than being specific to the union members. We also rule out experience rating of the unemployment insurance system; employers or employees in the sector do not con front predictable tax consequences of changes in unemployment.
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III UTILITY MAXIMIZATION
The union takes the initial level of public employment as given and ehooses a contractual wage for a period of a given length (two years, for example). For a utilitarian union, the objective takes the form The union selects r and Wc in order to maximize expression (8). Expectations are "rational" in the sense that the union knows the government policy rules, as given by (5) and (6). When the government discovers the state of world and the resulting level of unemployment or vacancies, it immediately adjusts the leve l of public employment.
-13 -Given the structure of the model, the union will set r the wage drift adjustment for public sector workers -at its upper limit, Le., r=l. oA oW c
Consider the first term in (9). An increase in the union-set wage by one unit implies an increase in the full employment wage as given by (l-A(l-Yl)).
This term is less than one (A<l and Yl<l) and
-A (l-y l) captures the reduction in wage drift that occurs as a result of the higher union-determined wage. The utility gain that accrues to the worker -14in good times if the contractual wage is increased by one unit is then given by
Note that this gain is increasing in the government I sreaction function coefficient, Yl. Alarger
Yl corresponds to a more ambi tious countercyc1ical policy in good times, i. e., a larger release of public sector employees. A contractual wage increase will always reduce the private sector l s labor force in good states , but the reduction will be larger the larger the value of Yl is; hence, the reduction in wage drift induced by a contractual wage increase will be offset to alarger extent.
An increase in the contractual wage will involve a utility gain for those who are employed in bad states; this is captured by the term (N 2 +G 2 )U ' (Wc) in the first-order condition. However, a higher union determined wage also causes a decrease in employment in the event of a bad state. The utility loss associated with this effect is given by the last term in (9). The term a1(1-Y2) gives the net employment effect; the private sectorls demand for labor falls by al units as Wc increases by one unit but public employment expands as given by the term 
Stabilization Policy and Wages
The policy parameters Yl and Y2 show how public employment adjusts to realized labor market imbal-
ances. An increase in Yl means that more public employees are laid off at a given initial number of vacancies. The union wage response is given by ( Il) Hence, a more ambitious countercyclical policy in 
where UN is initial unemployment. Again, stabilization policy produces an increase in the union determined wage. The union experiences an improved opportuni ty set; expected employment increases at a given contractual wage. The union responds by demanding an increase in the expected wage, which is achieved by choosing a higher contractual wage rate. This result, well-known from other studies (see, e.g., Calmfors and Horn, 1985) , hinges on the fact that the accommodation policy reduces the marginal cost of contractual wage increases in terms of lost employment.
We have considered two ingredients of a countercyclical stabilization policy -wage stabilization in good states and employment stabilization in bad states • The former policy reduces wage drift at a predetermined contractual wage whereas the latter reduces unemployment at a given contractual wage.
We have shown that both policies will induce the union to set a higher contractual wage. Clearly, a symmetric countercyclical policy -with government hirings in slumps and firings in booms -will also produce this union wage effect.
Other wage effects remain to consider • Consider , 
Hence, employment stabilization does increase public employment whereas wage stabilization has ambiguous effects.
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Limits to Government Growth
Employment in the public sector has so far been treated as endogenous to the union' s wage choice i the government hires unemployed workers according to the specified reaction function (6) whatever the absolute level of the resulting public employment will be. There are presumably several circumstances that will rule out an unlimi ted expansion of employment in the public sector, in the short run as well as in the long run. The long run includes considerations regarding future tax payments that may be required to close soaring budget deficits. The short run, which is in focus for our analysis, may be associated with capacity constraints in the public sector. Aside from such "technical" constraints, the government may also be constrained by (self-imposed or constitutional) precommitments concerning the level of public employment.
There are likely to be restrictions on government employment policy also in good states of the world. The size of the "reserve pool" of labor may be insufficient to allow the government to follow i ts public employment contraction according to a reaction function like (5).
If public employment is constrained by G 2 <G2' the pool of workers available for the private sector becomes fixed at L 2 = ~-~2. If the constraint is binding, a unit increase in the contractual wage will produce a reduction in total employment as given by the slope of the private sector's labor demand curve.
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In what follows we consider the case with "double constraints" on public employment. The union then knows that a good state involves public employment equal to ~l and that a bad state implies G 2 public employees. The size of the private labor force is stochastic, but not influenced by the union's wage choice.
The first-order condition in this case is expected public employment is G* and that PI =p 2 =P. This implies G 2 -G* = G* -~l so that government hirings in bad times are exactly offset by an equal number of government layoffs in good states.
We not e that We have found that a countercyclical employment policy will induce an increase in the contractual wage chosen by the union. Whether or not stabilization policies will increase welfare among union members remains to be seen.
A symmetric stabilization pOlicy, where the government expands in good times and contracts in bad ones, is equivalent to a reduction in demand uncertainty. We explore the implications for union welfare by inspecting the union's indirect utility function, ~ = ~(~1,G2' ••. ). Suppose, again, that the government's employment restriction is G 1 +G 2 = 2G* and consider the welfare effect of an increase (decrease) in public employrnent in bad (good) states. We obtain
where P=P1=PI.o. Expression (27) can be of either sign, so a countercyclical employment policy may or may not increase union welfare. A prerequisite for a negative welfare effect is that wage drift occurs in good states, i.e., k>O. Government layoffs in good times will reduce wage drift, and the associated utility loss may be strong enough to outweigh the utility gains from government hirings in bad states. where R = B/~,c . . ~ä. the, replq"gemen:t ra tio , T' ) is the pri vate sector 's elasticity of labor demand (T') = aIW/N) and ö is the private sector's share of the labor force. Clearly, oC1?/o~ is decreasing in the replacement ratio and increasing in (the absolute value of) the demand elastici ty. These relationships make intuitive sense. If the replacement ratio is high, the utility gains from countercyclical employment policies are small or negative. And if the labor demand schedule is inelastic, any given number of vacancies will produce more' wage drift, which is the basic rationale for a un:i.,on to be risk-loving. 
Profits in good states are affected in a less transparent way, as given by (32) where W~ = (L 1a O-z1)/a1 is the equilibrium wage associated with the good state. The first parenthesis captures the profit increase that occurs if wages are unaffected and the term kL 1 reflects the profit increase related to the induced reduction in wage drift. The last term, however, is negative, representing the profit reduction that occurs because of the higher contractual wage (oW c /oG 2 > O).
Capitaiists may be risk-loving for other reasons than unions. For example, if there is no wage drift, (i.e., ~=k=O), the union unambiguously prefers countercyclical employment policy; this does not hold for capitaiists • It appears difficult to give a precise characterization of conditions under which capitaiists will prefer such a policy; it depends on whether the profit increasing labor force effect will or will not dominate the profit decreasing wage effect. union welfare effect depends on the prevailing system of unemployment compensation; the lower the replacement ratio is, the "more likely" is it that a countercyclical policy will be welfare-improving for union members.
The framework outlined in this paper can be exten- -31 -NOTES l Oswald (1985) and Pencavel (1985) provide surveys of recent theoretical and empirical work in this area.
2 Hansen and Rehn (1956) is an early statistical study on wage drift. Phelps Brown (1962) reports on a number of European studies for the early post-war period. More recent studies for Sweden include Jacobsson and Lindbeck (1969), Isachsen (1977) , Holmlund (1978) , Schager (1981) and Söderström-Jondahl (1982) . 3 It is wellknown that various insti tutional and "structural" factors may contribute to the level of wage drift. For example, the proportion of workers on piece-rates has of ten been offered as an explanation of wage drift differentials across industries. We abstract from such structural factors and focus completely on the cyclical component. 4 Calmfors and Horn (1985) analyze this latter "accornrnodation case" in detail, using a certainty version of the monopoly union model. S We have estimated the following equations on Swedish quarterly data for the period af ter 1970: G t = aO + alUN t-l + seasonals G t = bO + b1Vt-1 + seasonals.
G is the number of work ers employed in relief works, UN is the total number of unemployed individuals and V is the number of vacancies registered at the employment exchange offices. The regressions yield: al = 0.42 " 2 (t=5.23, p=0.57, R =0.69) (t=-3.69, ~=0.35, R 2 =0.65).
" bl = -0.48
Taken at face values, the estimations indicate that an increase in unemployment by 10 000 is followed by an increase in relief work employment by 4 000 the following quarter.
-32 -6 The sign of (11) is ambiguous when wage drift adjustment is incomplete for public employees, i.e., r<l. A wage differential between private and public employees in good states imply a reallocation gain to the union when workers are transfered from the public to the private sector. The union "demands" a somewhat larger private sector, which implies an incenti ve to settIe for a lower contractual wage than otherwise • ., Oswald (1982) offers a number of results regarding union wage setting under uncertainty, using the monopoly union model without wage drift.
